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Lynd and Roberts: Alumni Profile

Alumni ProfileS

Studying law in Argentina just after the Dirty War, Professor
Claudia Martin believes that she was part of a generation that
went to law school to study human rights. “I never wanted to
be a traditional lawyer,” Martin notes, “and in the mid-eighties
democracy had just returned to Argentina, prosecutions of the
Juntas Militares were taking place, the human rights book,
Nunca Mas came out, and we all found a reason to be lawyers.”
Many of Martin’s classmates also wanted to study human rights
law, despite a lack of professional opportunities in Argentina
to develop a career in that particular field at that time. Like
Martin, many of her classmates pursued their careers outside of
Argentina.

and Haiti. She recalls interviewing torture victims, women who
had been raped, and victims with missing limbs. As a young
attorney she was eager to seek redress for these individuals.
“I had so much energy and passion to obtain justice for the
victims, but I did not have the experience to see the grey areas,”
Martin said. With maturity and experience, Martin is now better
able to see the overall problems, including the various elements
necessary to help victims. Unlike in her early years of practicing
human rights law, Martin can now “appreciate the nuances of
different strategies.”
One such strategy is to enlarge the community around
the Inter-American system in an effort to strengthen it. This
is exactly what her work as Co-Director of the Academy on
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law entails. Programs, such
as the Inter-American Moot Court Competition are life-changing
experiences for many students who later choose a career in
human rights because of their participation in the competition.
“I often hear from people years after they participate, how the
competition inspired them,” Martin said. In addition to the competition, Martin facilitates the Program of Advanced Studies on
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law — a WCL specialized
summer program. She also does consulting with the Academy,
focusing primarily on training different legal actors on human
rights and the Inter-American system. Furthermore, she works
to expand the Inter American system community by editing
the Inter-American System section of the Oxford International
Law Reports and serving on the advisory board of Oxford’s
International Law in Domestic Courts database. She has published extensively on the Inter-American system and on impunity in Latin America.

In 1992, Martin was accepted into the LL.M program at
the Washington College of Law (WCL). She applied to WCL
because she wanted to study with Dean Claudio Grossman and
Professor Robert Goldman, both of who have expertise in international human rights. Martin came to WCL at a time when the
law school’s commitment to human rights was expanding. The
year before Martin attended WCL, the Center for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law was formed. During her studies, she was
part of a group of J.D. and LL.M students who collaborated
to form the Human Rights Brief and the Inter-American Moot
Court Competition. “In all the years I’ve attended and worked
for WCL, it was one of the best collaborations between J.D. and
LL.M students that I’ve seen,” Martin said. These two projects
have now experienced over a decade of ongoing success.
Martin has devoted most of her career to the Inter-American
system of human rights. After obtaining her LL.M, she worked
for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. At the
Commission, Martin interviewed victims who filed complaints.
During her work there, many of the complaints came out of Peru
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social and cultural rights as part of the human rights framework.
Many students believe that adequate maternity leave programs
are not a right, but merely an extension of feminist thought.
Martin asserts, “I tell them it is an economic right, because as
far as I know, we all come from mothers and not from a lechuga!
[lettuce]” Nonetheless, Martin has great respect for the human
rights already embedded in U.S. domestic law. She believes,
however, that international human rights law can refresh the
domestic debate and push things forward because “you lose
sight when you are entrenched in your own domestic debate.”

Even though Martin claims that she “saw the potential of
the Inter-American system long ago,” she did not think it would
have the impact that it has today to strike down laws or receive
the high level of deference from Latin American countries.
Yet, Martin hopes that the system will continue to improve.
Increased funding is key to allowing the Commission and the
Court to address more issues. The system has done well in
addressing political and civil rights, and even serving vulnerable
groups, such as women, children and indigenous populations.
Nevertheless, Martin believes the system will eventually need to
address more concerns on economic, social and cultural rights.
This challenge is part of the ongoing international debate regarding the justiciability of these rights. Martin notes that the universal human rights system is beginning to address the same issues
with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The protocol would create a complaint and inquiry mechanism
for the ICESCR. Additionally, Martin has seen domestic courts
in Latin America increasingly address economic rights that have
either been written into their constitutions or through the ratification of international treaties.

For students who want to work in international human rights
law, Martin provides a few points of advice. To start, she suggests that students “learn broken English!” If students want to
channel their interests in human rights law, they should keep
an open mind, travel, and learn a foreign language. Moreover,
she counsels students to start early in their careers so that they
can make the right contacts in a field that is very competitive.
“When you work internationally you’re not just competing
against American law school graduates, but with lawyers the
whole world over,” she said. While Martin advises students to
become as knowledgeable as possible in human rights law, she
warns that they should expect and be willing to make professional sacrifices, such as accepting unpaid internships in law
school. Martin’s professional success is a testament to this
advice.

Martin has also observed the debate about the justiciability
of economic, social and cultural rights unfold in the Human
Rights survey course she teaches at WCL. “WCL students are
very interested in learning, and many are already educated
about human rights, so it is a pleasure to work with them,”
Martin said. Having been born and raised in Argentina, Martin
brings a unique perspective to her primarily American students.
She notes the hesitancy of many students to include economic,

Jessica Lynd, a JD candidate at the Washington College
of Law, wrote this Alumni Profile for the Human Rights Brief.
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In reflecting on the most rewarding aspect of her job,
Washington College of Law (WCL) alumnus, Meg Hobbins,
expressed how privileged she is to be in a position to help her
clients: “I learn time and again from them what it means to be
truly resilient and courageous.” Hobbins graduated magna cum
laude from WCL, and she currently works at Maggio + Kattar,
a leading boutique immigration law firm in Washington, DC.
Before attending law school Hobbins obtained her undergraduate degree in Anthropology and Political Science cum laude at
Rice University. She spent her junior year studying aboriginal
law in Sydney, Australia, where she also worked with a small
non-profit organization called Refugee Advice and Casework
Services as a research assistant. Her work there focused on the
representation of detained Iraqi, Afghan, and Kosovar asylees
whose boats were intercepted off the coast of Australia. Through
her interaction with the clients and working in a “frenzied atmosphere with passionate advocates,” Hobbins felt “instantly at
home” and knew that she had found her “professional calling”
in human rights law. Although Hobbins had initially planned to
attend law school after completing her undergraduate degree,
she first wanted to gain an understanding of daily life in developing countries and work on her language skills. Hobbins joined
the Peace Corps and worked in Togo as a community health/
AIDS prevention volunteer, teaching sex education in middle
schools and working with at-risk teenagers.

Professor Muneer Ahmad. During her third year, Hobbins spent
a semester abroad studying international human rights law at the
University of Paris X.
Hobbins describes her participation in IHRL Clinic as the
“most important academic experience of my life.” She benefitted
from “incredible” mentors — including Rick Wilson, Muneer
Ahmad, and Sarah Paoletti — and worked on behalf of very
deserving clients. Through IHRL Clinic, Hobbins and her clinic
partner represented two clients in removal proceedings at the
Arlington Immigration Court. One of the clients was a Haitian
domestic violence survivor seeking relief under the Violence
Against Women Act, and the other was a detained Somali asylee
applying for a refugee waiver for past criminal offenses. Both
clients prevailed and became permanent residents of the United
States. Hobbins regularly draws on her clinic experience in her
current practice regarding ethics, client goal identification, and
case presentation. In short, she states, “everything I learned
about lawyering in law school, I learned in clinic.”
Following graduation from WCL, Hobbins was an Attorney
General’s Honors Clerk at the Baltimore and York Immigration
Courts, where she worked for judges drafting decisions and
memoranda, and assisted with legal research. While at the
Baltimore Immigration Court, she helped establish a system
whereby the court would notify the CAIR Coalition of the
location of unrepresented and detained respondents who had
upcoming hearings. Because of her love for direct service work,
Hobbins was initially reluctant to work as a law clerk. However,
she enjoyed and valued her experience at the immigration courts
because, in addition to learning about the substance of the law,
she gained insight about how judges make decisions. Hobbins
then worked as a staff attorney at the Pennsylvania Immigration
Resource Center (PIRC), providing direct representation to
detainees at the York County Prison who faced removal proceedings before the York Immigration Court. While at PIRC,
Hobbins also educated recently arriving detainees about their
rights, and the types of relief available to noncitizens.

During her first year at WCL, Hobbins was a member of the
WCL Immigrant Rights Coalition (IRC). She also participated
in an immigration experiential learning project, and she traveled
to Juarez, Mexico to learn about femicide for an Alternative
Spring Break trip. Over the summer, she interned at the Capital
Area Immigrants’ Rights (CAIR) Coalition. In addition to her continued involvement with the CAIR Coalition and IRC during her
second year, Hobbins joined the Journal of Gender, Social Policy,
and the Law, and was a student attorney for the International
Human Rights Law (IHRL) Clinic. She then interned at the
Houston Immigration Court, and worked as a Dean’s Fellow for
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Hobbins’s current work at Maggio + Kattar includes removal
defense, extreme hardship waivers for individuals who would
qualify for permanent residency aside from immigration violations or criminal offenses, marriage-based adjustment of status,
consular processing for immigrant and non-immigrant visas,
naturalization, and appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals
and the Administrative Appeals Office. On an average day,
Hobbins does “a little bit of everything,” such as meeting with
clients, researching and writing briefs, drafting declarations, and
finalizing filings for submission to courts, agencies, and consulates. Hobbins is a member of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association and the CAIR Coalition, which honored her for her
volunteer service in 2009.

narrow categories of the law. Hobbins strongly believes that
everyone deserves an individualized custody determination to
ascertain whether he or she is a danger to the community or a
flight risk, rather than being subjected to mandatory detention as
currently required for many respondents. She would also like to
see improvements in collegiality between immigration attorneys
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in support
of a shared goal to faithfully apply U.S. immigration law. Most
importantly, she would like to see progress towards creating
legal status for the eleven million undocumented individuals
in the United States who currently live in fear without the full
protection of the law.
Hobbins encourages students who aspire to a career in
human rights law to cultivate relationships with members of the
human rights and immigration law communities. “Every relationship you form will yield positive results,” she says, “whether
it is inspiration, advice on a tough case, a recommendation for
a new position, or an interesting case referral.” She also recommends interning or working in various professional contexts
because each experience offers opportunities to learn something
new and become more informed advocates. Although Hobbins
initially pictured herself working abroad in international human
rights law, she realized in law school that there was so much
to be accomplished in the area of human rights in the United
States that she could have a fulfilling career wherever she lived.
Hobbins’s experience at WCL and her career clearly reflect her
commitment to advocating, not only on behalf of individuals
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses, but also for
improvements in United States immigration practices to ensure
respect for human rights.

Hobbins says that she is fortunate to work at a firm that supports its attorneys in regularly taking complex pro bono cases.
Three of her current pro bono cases concern egregious constitutional violations during immigration raids. She emphasizes
the importance of due process in immigration proceedings,
particularly given the increase in local enforcement mechanisms. Hobbins wrote an article about the application of due
process for Immigration Briefings entitled, “A Practitioner’s
Guide to Motions to Suppress Evidence and Terminate Removal
Proceedings Due to Constitutional and Regulatory Violations,”
to provide assistance to other attorneys as they challenge unlawful government conduct. This work supports Hobbins’s desire
to see a greater commitment among the immigration bar to
outstanding representation and client education.
One of the most challenging aspects of Hobbins’s job is
the often “restrictive and unforgiving” nature of immigration
law. She would like to see more discretion in various aspects
of removal proceedings and more flexibility in granting relief,
particularly for compelling cases that do not fit within the

Lindsay Roberts, a JD candidate at the Washington College of
Law, wrote this Alumni Profile for the Human Rights Brief.
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Endnotes: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security — Is it Binding?
27

52

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21)
[hereinafter Namibia Case].
28 These include Resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 276 (1970).
29 Namibia Case, supra note 27.
30 Id. ¶ 113.
31 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 39 (July 9).
32 Id. ¶ 34.
33 Öberg, supra note 1 at 879-906.
34 U.N. Charter art. 24.
35 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Article 25,
Supp. 1 (1954 – 1955), Vol. 1, ¶1, available at http://www.un.org/law/
repertory/.
36 Öberg, supra note 1, at 885.
37 Higgins, supra note 26, at 279.
38 Namibia Case, supra note 27, ¶115.
39 This conclusion is supported, among other scholars, by Stephen
Zunes, International Law, the UN and Middle Eastern Conflicts, 16
Peace Rev. 285, 86-92 (Sept. 2004). See also Higgins, supra note 29.
40 Higgins, supra note 26 at 282.
41 Namibia Case, supra note 31, para. 113.
42 Öberg, supra note 2, at 14.
43 Id at 880-881; see also, Higgins, supra note 26 at 278.
44 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 8.
45 In particular, the Resolution points to “the obligations applicable
to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional
Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the
Protocol thereto of 1967.” See also Id. ¶¶10, 11.
46 Higgins, supra note 26 at 278.
47 Tryggestad supra note 8.
48 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 at 254–255.
49 Id. ¶ 73.
50 Id. ¶ 93.
51 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 1.

Id.
Beijing Declaration, G.A. Res. 52/231, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/231
(June 17, 1998).
54 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 2.
55 Michael W. Doyle, A Global Constitution? The Struggle over the
UN Charter, NYU Symposium (September, 2010), available at http://
www.iilj.org/courses/documents/HC2010Sept22.Doyle.pdf.
56 Ibid, 3.
57 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
58 Wood, supra note 12 at 86. Though he issues the caveat that the
Preamble could be used as “dumping ground” for proposals not
acceptable in the operative paragraphs.
59 See U.N. Secretary-General, Improvement of the Status of Women
in the Secretariat: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/49/587
(Nov. 1, 1994).
60 Namibia Case, supra note 27, para. 113.
61 Öberg, supra note 1, at 880-81.
62 S.C. Res 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 6.
63 Id. ¶ 7, which provides: “Recalling also United Nations Security
Council’s Resolution 1325 (2000) on the role of women in promoting peace and security.” See also U.N. Charter arts. 10, 11 (pertaining
to right to peace and protection of women in armed conflict respectively).
64 These include S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1820 (2008) and
S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/Res/18888 (2009) on sexual violence in
armed conflict; and S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1889 (2009) on
practical ways to accelerate the implementation of Res. 1325.
65 C. Cora True-Frost, The UN Security Council Marks Seventh
Anniversary of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security with
Open Debate, Am. Soc’y Int’l L. (December 17, 2007), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights071217.cfm.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Tryggestad, supra note 8.
70 These include Spain, Canada, The Netherlands, etc.
71 Contra Tryggestad, supra note 8.
53

Endnotes: De-democratisation in Israel: Repressions Against Human Rights Defenders and the Need
for Implementation of the EU Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
16

mks-push-for-further-pressure-on-human-rights-groups-as-restrictivelegislation-progresses
22 See MKs push for further pressure on human rights groups as
restrictive legislation progresses, JNews, March, 10, 2011, available
at http://www.jnews.org.uk/news/mks-push-for-further-pressure-onhuman-rights-groups-as-restrictive-legislation-progresses
23 Id.
24 Bill no. P/18/2456. The bill stipulates: “No association will be
formed if the Registrar has been persuaded that the association will
be involved with or will convey to foreign elements information on
the subject of law suits proceeding in instances operating outside of
the State of Israel, against senior persons in Israel or military officers,
due to war crimes.”
25 See Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel:
New Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel,p. 9, November 29,
2010; See also Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war.
Israel against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.13-15
26 Article 22, ICCPR, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
ccpr.htm; article 22 stipulates:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the

For a detailed presentation of the anti-democratic bills see: NGO
report to the UN Human Rights Committee: Palestinian citizens of
Israel. Response to the list of issues to be taken into consideration of
the third periodic report of Israel, p. 10. Submitted on 24 June 2010.
Report submitted by Adalah, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights and
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel. http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/
eng/jun10/docs/REPSONE_AAP.pdf
17 See Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel:
New Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel,pp. 8-9, November 29,
2010.
18 See Jonathan Lis: Knesset passes bill to make Israeli NGOs report
foreign contributers. Haaretz, February 22, 2011.
19 See Jonathan Lis: Knesset passes bill to make Israeli NGOs report
foreign contributers. Haaretz, February 22, 2011
20 See Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war. Israel
against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.13
21 See statement by Arab NGOs in Israel in February 2011,
available at http://www.old-adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/
pr.php?file=24_02_11_1; See also MKs push for further pressure
on human rights groups as restrictive legislation progresses,
JNews, March, 10, 2011, available at http://www.jnews.org.uk/news/
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protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security
or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This
article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members
of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
27 Press release on 29th of April 2010 by the Coalition of the General
Directors of human rights organizations in Israel (Adalah – The
Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, The Association
for Civil Rights in Israel, Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights,
B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in
the Occupied Territories, Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of
Movement, HaMoked – Center for the Defence of the Individual,
Physicians for Human Rights – Israel, The Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel, Rabbis for Human Rights, and Yesh Din – Volunteers
for Human Rights) http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/
pr.php?file=29_04_10
28 The proposed bill states: “One must not initiate a boycott on the
State of Israel, nor encourage participation in such a boycott, nor offer
assistance or information in attempt to promote such a boycott”
29 „Besieging Israel‘s siege“. The Guardian. August 12, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/besieging-israel-siege-palestinian-boycott .
30 See MKs push for further pressure on human rights groups, supra
n. 22; See also Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war.
Israel against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.16
31 See Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war. Israel
against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.16
32 See MKs push for further pressure on human rights groups, supra n. 22.
33 Statement of the European Union (22/02/2011) at the Tenth
Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council available at
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press_corner/all_news/
news/2011/20110222_01_en.htm
34 For an analysis and summary of all current anti-democratic bills
and new laws in Israel see The Association for Civil Rights in Israel:
Knesset 2010-2011 Winter Session: Legislative Roundup. April 2011,
available at http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=2033
35 See Harriet Sherwood: Israel proposes Jewish state loyalty oath for
new citizens. Loyalty pledge criticised as ‘fascist’ and an affront to
country’s Palestinian citizens, who make up 20% of population. The
guardian, October 10, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/oct/10/israel-jewish-oath-new-citizens
36 See gush shalom, available at http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/
en/events/1286745470
37 Press release of October 10, 2010, http://zope.gush-shalom.org/
home/en/events/1286745470/
38 Jonathan Lis and Jack Khoury: “Knesset panel approves controversial bill allowing towns to reject residents”. Haaretz. October 27th,
2010. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knesset-panel-approvescontroversial-bill-allowing-towns-to-reject-residents-1.321433
39 See Association for Civil Rights in Israel: Final vote today on
Nakba Law and Acceptance to Communities Bill, March 22, 2011,
available http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=1805; See also attorney Debbie
Gild-Hayo: “Dark stains on the law books. The chilling effect of the
Nakba Law will extend beyond the Arab citizens of Israel to public
bodies of all types.” Haaretz. March 25, 2011
40 Letter of ACRI’s attorneys Dan Yakir and Gil Gan-Mor to Reuven
Rivlin, Speaker of the Knesset on November 23, 2010, available at
http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=1805
41 See Debbie Gild-Hayo: “Dark stains on the law books. The
chilling effect of the Nakba Law will extend beyond the Arab citizens
of Israel to public bodies of all types.” Haaretz. March 25, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/dark-stains-on-the-lawbooks-1.351700

Nakba in Arabic means catastrophe, referring to the expulsion of
Palestinians from their homeland in 1948
43 Debbie Gild-Hayo: “Dark stains on the law books. The chilling
effect of the Nakba Law will extend beyond the Arab citizens of
Israel to public bodies of all types.” Haaretz. March 25, 2011. http://
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/dark-stains-on-the-lawbooks-1.351700
44 See for example Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out
war. Israel against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.10
45 See Jonathan Liz: “Knesset revokes Arab MK Zuabi’s privileges
over Gaza flotilla.” Haaret.July 13, October 2010. http://www.haaretz.
com/news/national/knesset-revokes-arab-mk-zuabi-s-privilegesover-gaza-flotilla-1.301750
46 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Committee on the Human Rights of
Parliamentarians
Case No. IL/04 - HANEEN ZOABI - Israel
Confidential decision adopted by the Committee at its 130th session
(Geneva, 12 - 15 July 2010), http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/heb/
jul10/docs/IPU.pdf
47 See “Israel’s democracy. Under siege too. Some liberals say that
Israel’s vaunted democracy is under threat.” The Economist. June 17th
, 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16381128/print
48 Uri Avnery: “A parliamentary mob. Inside the Israeli Knesset.”
Counterpunch. July 20, 2010. http://www.counterpunch.org/
avnery07202010.html
49 See Amnesty International, Palestinian Human Rights Activist
Jailed, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/
palestinian-human-rights-activist-jailed-israel-2011-01-30
50 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/palestinian-humanrights-activist-jailed-israel-2011-01-30
51 See http://palsolidarity.org/2010/12/16034/and http://www.
amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/palestinian-activist-faces-prisonsentence-2010-06-11
52 See http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/palestinian-antiwall-protester-convicted-israeli-military-court-2010-08-27
53 Press release available at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/documents/news/20102010_abdallahaburahma_en.pdf
54 Answer Nr. 8 of the German government to a minor interpellation
of Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010
55 See for example Amnesty International General Report 2010 (in
German). Section on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Teritories, p.
218. Frankfurt am Main 2010.
56 Answer Nr. 8 of the German government to a minor interpellation
of Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010
57 Ninth report of the German government’s human rights politics (in
German), covering the period March 1st 2008- February 28th 2010, pp.
106-107
58 Answer Nr. 5 of the German government to a minor interpellation
of Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010
59 Ninth report of the German government’s human rights politics (in
German), covering the period March 1st 2008- February 28th 2010, pp.
111
60 Answer of the German government to a minor interpellation of
Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010
61 Lecture of Sahar Francis from Addameer in the German Bundestag
in November 2010.
62 See Robert Fisk: “Israel has crept into the EU without anyone
noticing.” The independent. July 31st 2010. http://www.independent.
co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-israel-has-crept-into-theeu-without-anyone-noticing-2040066.html
63 See report by Tsafrir Cohen (representative of medico international
in Israel & Palestine): “ Israel: de-democratisation (in German)”.
medico-Rundschreiben II 2010. July 1st, 2010. http://www.medico.de/
material/rundschreiben/2010/02/die-innere-entdemokratisierung/from
1 July 2010.
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Article two of the agreements stipulates: “Relations between the
Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be
based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which

guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.” available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecisrfta.pdf

Endnotes: Liberté Religieuse en Europe: Discussing the French Concealment Act
18

31

Burqa ban passes French lower house, supra note 29. If the person
forced to wear the veil is a child, the perpetrator may receive a 30,000
euro fine. Doland, supra note 23; see also Gauthiers-Villar & Forelle,
supra note 3.
32 Reports often conflate the burqa with the niqab and so exact
numbers are unclear. For example, Fox News reports “at most 2,000
women in France wear the outlawed veils.” France’s Ban on FaceCovering Islamic Veil Met with Defiance, Fox News, Apr. 11, 2011,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/11/france-bansface-covering-islamic-veil-1300456722/. The Fox News report appears
to include both the burqa and the niqab in its 2,000 estimate. CNN
is nebulous in its identification. When referring to the 2,000 women
affected by the legislation, CNN simply refers to the clothing as
“the garment.” 2 arrested as France’s ban on burqa’s, niqabs takes
effect, supra note 7. However, at least two other sources indicate that
the 2,000 estimate only refers to the niqab. Doland, supra note 23;
Erlanger, supra note 6. Regardless of whether the number includes or
excludes the burqa, the extremely limited number of women wearing
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